Many concepts that are used in abnormal psychology are not well defined, so their meanings vary somewhat from speaker to speaker. Variation in usage is not surprising because symptoms and other clinical phenomena are often abstract terms that summarize a diverse collection of maladaptive feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. Because the terms are imprecise in meaning, they also generate relatively low interjudge reliability. If we better understood the nature of these concepts, we might be able to describe the average person's meaning, clarify the variations in usage, and perhaps explain the source of the unreliability.
In the research reported below, we have adopted the concept of a prototype to describe ill-defined terms like depression. The concept of a prototype defines a kind of theoretical ideal, a theoretical standard against which real people can be evaluated. No one
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Requests for reprints should be sent to Leonard M. Horowitz, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305. person matches the theoretical standard perfectly, but different people approximate it to different degrees. The more closely the person approximates the ideal, the more the person typifies the concept.
The concept of a prototype has been developed in the literature of cognitive psychology (e.g., Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976 ) as a way of contrasting an ill-defined category with a welldefined category. Although some categories can be defined precisely in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria, many categories cannot be defined so precisely, and in recent years scholars have come to examine categories of this type. Members of the category "chairs," for example, share many properties with each other: Some chairs are alike in being wooden, others are alike in having padding, still others are alike in having four legs. These characteristics, however, are neither necessary nor sufficient. We could list all the most common features that people think of when they describe a chair, and the composite of the most frequent features would operationalize the theoretical ideal, the prototype. No actual chair would have all of these features, and very few features would apply to all chairs. However, in practice, some chairs have more of these features than others, and a chair with a large number of features would generally be a good example of that category. Thus, a kitchen chair (which has many features) is a good example 568 of the category, whereas a beanbag chair, which has fewer features, is a poorer example. Concepts from the literature of personality have also been subjected to this kind of analysis (Cantor & Mischel, 1977 , 1979 Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich, 1980) .
In this article we report two studies of prototypes of three diagnostic concepts for disturbed children. In Study 1 we describe the procedure that we have used to define such prototypes operationally. The method allows us to determine the major features of the prototype and to organize them semantically so as to portray a concept like that of "a depressed person." It allows us to describe the meaning of the term and to differentiate among different forms of the concept. In addition, individuals can be compared to the theoretical standard.
In Study 2 we examine the proposition that the meaning of a clinical concept changes as the user gains clinical experience; the prototype allows us to identify these changes. A novice's meaning of depression, for example, is quite different from an expert's meaning: The expert's prototype generally contains more features, but there are also occasional features in the novice's prototype that are not included in the expert's prototype. These changes sometimes highlight important differences between novices' and experts' implicit theories, suggesting, at times, different treatment strategies.
Study 1 Method
This study developed and examined prototypes of three kinds of "problem child." It was conducted at Wediko Children's Services of Boston, Massachusetts, which offers a short-term residential treatment program for disturbed children, ages 7 to 17 years. Disturbed children are referred to this summer program each year through school officials, psychotherapists, and community agencies. The staff members who participated in this research project were all affiliated with programs designed for children between the ages of 7 and 14 years. These staff members convene early in June before the children arrive, and the data described below were collected at that time.
One group of staff members, the "experts," consisted of supervisors in the program. These people all had advanced degrees in clinical psychology, special education, social work, or psychiatric nursing, and they had been with the program for 3-14 years. Their orientation was eclectic with respect to case formulation, treatment planning, and case management.
To identify the major diagnostic labels used at the facility, we asked the experts to list the three to five most common categories of children. Two raters read the responses and tabulated them to form a frequency distribution. They agreed perfectly in identifying the three most common labels used at Wediko: the aggressive-impulsive child, the depressed-withdrawn child, and the borderline-disorganized child. These categories resemble Achenbach's (1981) basic dimensions of childhood psychopathology and were the ones used to generate the prototypes described below.
We then asked each of 10 experts to think of characteristics of each type of child and describe the child's most usual feelings, thoughts, and behaviors, They were also encouraged to be as specific as they could, and to list as many characteristics as they could. Each respondent completed a description of each type of child on separate pages; each page contained three sections with the headings "feelings," "thoughts," and "behaviors" systematically counterbalanced across respondents. Each writer's description was then typed verbatim and submitted to three judges (three of the authors), who independently counted and tabulated every feature. These judges later met to compare the features that they had identified for each of the three diagnostic categories. When a disagreement arose over an item, the judges discussed that item until they reached a consensus. The final result listed all of the different features in the experts' responses and the relative frequency of each.
The reliability of the final tabulation was tested on an independent group of three judges, students who were not familiar with details of the study. These students were shown the experts' original responses, together with the judges' final tabulation of features. They were asked to match each item of the experts' descriptions with a feature listed in the final tabulation. The relative frequency with which each feature was used in the student judges' tabulations was correlated with the corresponding relative frequency in the original judges' tabulation. The value of r was .91, so the final tabulation of features seems to be reproducible by an independent group of judges.
Features that had occurred with a probability of .29 or higher were taken to form the final prototype. This criterion was selected arbitrarily throughout Studies 1 and 2 in order to generate a pool of features that was large enough to permit the comparisons described below. The features were also organized semantically by the following procedure. Fifty students from classes in introductory psychology and abnormal psychology at Stanford University participated in the study to satisfy a course requirement. They were told that they would be asked to judge which personality characteristics seemed to go together. They were tested in groups of one to three people. Each subject was given a stack of cards that contained the features, one to a card. They were told that the cards contained characteristics that people have used in describing a child, and that as they looked through the cards, they would find that certain characteristics had similar meanings and together formed a category. They were to go through the list and form categories of characteristics that seemed similar in meaning. They were asked to sort the cards into as many categories as they wished. Then we computed a matrix showing how often each feature was categorized to-gether with each other feature. This matrix of proportions, a "similarity matrix," was then subjected to a hierarchical clustering technique, the nearest neighbor method (Johnson, 1967; Everitt, 1974, pp. 9-11) .
Results and Discussion
Twenty-five features met the .29-or-higher criterion for the aggressive-impulsive child. The results of the clustering procedure applied to these features are shown in Figure  1 . The smallest rectangle (denoted a) signifies a tight cluster of features that are closest in meaning. These features had been classified together by 61% or more of the subjects. The larger the rectangle, the weaker the cluster. Groups of features that are not enclosed in a common rectangle are semantically separate, independent clusters. Figure  1 as a whole thus portrays the general meaning the experts ascribed to the concept of an aggressive-impulsive child.
The 25 features in Figure 1 fall into two independent groups of features. The larger cluster concerns aggression per se-fighting, intimidating, acting out. A second large cluster concerns a sense of vulnerability, feelings of inadequacy, and low self-esteem. The picture as a whole portrays the average concept of an aggressive-impulsive child for experienced staff members. It shows a composite of the most commonly mentioned feelings, thoughts, and behaviors.
The composite in Figure 1 can be tentatively viewed as a kind of theoretical ideal that is activated by the phrase "an aggressive-impulsive child." This theoretical ideal establishes a set of potential features, features with a heightened probability of characterizing a child who fits the category. In Figure 1 . The experts' prototype of an aggressive-impulsive child.
a sense, this theoretical ideal may be taken as an operational form of the experts' "implicit personality theory" (Schneider, 1973) about aggressive-impulsive children. The literature on implicit personality theories concerns correlations that people assume to exist among traits, and the general semantic structure of these traits; that structure is captured by the semantic organization of the features in the prototype. Figure 2 shows the prototype of a depressed-withdrawn child that was derived in the same way. There were 24 features that together provide the general meaning of the concept. Figure 2 shows that this concept consists of three separate clusters of features. One contains features concerning the child's low self-esteem-feels inferior, expects to fail. A second concerns the child's anger and hostility toward other people. The third concerns the child's self-imposed isolation from other people. The composite set is viewed as a structure that is activated in the experts by the phrase "a depressed-withdrawn child." Figure 3 shows the prototype of a disorganized-borderline child derived in the same way. There were 21 features in this prototype, and it consisted of two separate clusters of features. One cluster describes the child's peculiarity in thinking-loose associations, obsessed with strange thoughts, distractibility, poor reality testing, bizarre behavior. The second describes the child's feelings of vulnerability, low self-esteem, and feelings of inadequacy.
Several features occurred in all three prototypes, namely, the features "feels angry,"
. Has low self-esteem (feels inferior, inadequate)
. Figure 2 . The experts' prototype of a depressed-withdrawn child.
"feels sad," and "has low self-esteem." In general, these features seemed to characterize all three types of disturbed child, so they do not contribute distinctively to any one prototype. Other features were shared by two prototypes, and it was possible to differentiate between shared features (which occurred in two or more prototypes) and unique features (which did not). The prototype of the aggressive-impulsive child contained 9 shared and 16 unique features; that of the depressed-withdrawn child, 6 shared and 18 unique features; and that of the disorganized-borderline child, 12 shared and only 9 unique features. The disorganizedborderline child has relatively fewer unique features and relatively more shared features. For this reason the probability is higher that some subset of features from the disorganized-borderline prototype would activate one of the other labels. Judges might therefore disagree more often about the appropriateness of the label, and it is hypothesized that the label "disorganized-borderline child" would yield lower interjudge reliability than the other two labels. This hypothesis will be tested in a future study.
Study 2
As people become more sophisticated in using a concept (through clinical training, for example), subtle changes should occur in their prototypes: New features should be added to the prototype and others should drop out. The prototypic features of an aggressive-impulsive child, for example, should show the effect of the experts' training, so the experts' prototype should contain additional features beyond those in the laymen's prototype. Also, some features should drop out of the laymen's prototype as a result of Figure 3 . The experts' prototype of a disorganized-borderline child.
the training. For this reason we wanted to generate a prototype for staff members who were less experienced clinically.
Method
This study was also conducted at Wediko Children's Services, where we identified two groups of less experienced staff members. One of these groups was called returnees. They were 21 college students who had participated in the summer program during the previous summer and thus had some, but minimal, clinical training. The other group was called novices. They consisted of 24 newcomers to the staff who were also college students but had never participated in the treatment program before. They were just about to begin a period of training. Each member of these groups was asked to describe the same three kinds of disturbed children. Then each writer's description was typed verbatim and submitted to three judges (three of the authors), who independently counted and tabulated every feature. The procedure for generating each prototype was identical to that of Study 1.
Results and Discussion
Aggressive-impulsive child. The resulting prototypes for the aggressive-impulsive child generated by returnees and by novices were similar to that of the experts, but fewer features reached prototype status. The prototype of the returnees contained 12 features from the experts' prototype and that of novices contained 9 features from the experts' prototype. Clearly, the experts had the largest number of prototypic features and the novices had the fewest.
The novices mentioned two features that the more experienced groups rarely or never mentioned-perhaps misconceptions or overgeneralizations about an aggressive-impulsive child. First, the novices viewed the aggressive-impulsive child as feeling unloved: 42% of the novices mentioned that the child thinks "Nobody likes me." Second, the novices viewed the aggressive-impulsive child as wanting attention; this feature was mentioned by 33% of the novices. The prototypic features of the returnees, unlike those of the novices, did not include idiosyncratic features: All of their prototypic features occurred in the prototype of the experts.
Because idiosyncratic features are part of the novices' implicit theory about aggressive-impulsive children, their presence can have treatment implications. If novices view an aggressive-impulsive child as feeling unloved and wanting attention, their treatment of the child would reflect this view. That is, novices may more often monitor their behavior so as not to reject the child. That is, they may indulge the child at times when more experienced therapists would set firmer limits. Also, if these features reflect a theory that is not valid, their treatment would impede therapeutic progress. The prototype thus highlights differences between novices and experts that may have conceptual and practical significance.
Depressed-withdrawn child. The prototypes of the depressed-withdrawn child for the two less experienced groups were similar to that of the experts' but, again, they contained fewer features. The returnees' prototype contained 13 features, all included among the 24 features mentioned by the experts. The novices' prototype contained 10 of the experts' features, plus 2 additional features. One was that the depressed-withdrawn child "engages in self-stimulation"; this feature was mentioned by 42% of the novices, rarely by either of the other groups. The other was that the child "feels safer by withdrawing." This feature was mentioned by 33% of the novices. The first of these features suggests that novices confused a depressed-withdrawn child with a disorganized-borderline child. The prototype of the depressed-withdrawn child thus showed differences similar to that of the aggressiveimpulsive child.
Disorganized-borderline child. Finally, we examined differences in the prototype of the disorganized-borderline child. The returnees' prototype contained nine features, which were all included among the 21 features of the experts' prototype. The novices' prototype contained seven features that were in the experts' prototype plus two additional features. One of these additional features stated that the disorganized-borderline child exhibits inappropriate speech (babbles); this feature was mentioned by 33% of the novices. The other was that the child is disoriented, feels lost; that feature was mentioned by 29% of the novices.
It is interesting that all three prototypes showed very comparable differences. The number of features in the three prototypes was quite stable for a given group of respondents. Also, the returnees' features were always a subset of those of the experts, and in each case, the novices' prototype included two features that were not prototypic for the more experienced groups. We assume, based on our experience at Wediko, that these differences reflect an actual difference in the concept itself; that is, we assume that the groups differed in the way that they conceptualize the child in question and that they would therefore treat a prototypic child differently. Of course, it is also possible that these differences do not reflect a true conceptual difference but only a difference in the existence of a common clinical language. In that case, different groups would not respond differently to a prototypic child. This question will be examined in future studies.
These studies suggest that the construct of a prototype can be used to investigate important phenomena of abnormal psychology. The procedure for deriving a prototype can be used to identify the major features of a concept, and to highlight similarities and differences among concepts. Two limitations of the prototype should be noted, however. One is that prototypic features describe people's conceptions, not the structure of reality. Therefore, a prototypic feature may not be accurate or valid. Although a prototypic aggressive-impulsive child is commonly described as "confused," the feature itself could reflect a general bias or misconception; its accuracy would have to be established independently. Another is that a prototype does not explain the etiology of the corresponding condition. It may, however, suggest leads towards a theory or summarize existing theories. Indeed, the prototype of a depressed-withdrawn child contained subsets of features corresponding to each of the major contemporary theories of depressionfor example, clusters describing helplessness, negative self-conceptions, internalized aggression, and isolation from other people.
Within these limitations, however, the prototype suggests further directions for research. For one thing we need to understand how particular features come to activate a particular prototype. A feature that readily occurred when the prototype was formed may not be one that readily activates the prototype. For example, a prototypic depressed-withdrawn child readily suggests the feature "feels inferior"; but the feature "feels inferior" may not be the strongest cue for activating the prototype. Directional differences of this type need to be examined empirically.
In addition, the prototype may help explain why observers sometimes disagree in applying a concept. When observers disagree in calling a patient depressed, the disagreement may arise from the stimulus description itself. If the stimulus contains some, but not many, features of a prototype, those features may activate the full prototype in some observers and fail to do so in other observers, causing interobserver unreliability. That is the subject of a subsequent report (Horowitz, Post, French, Wallis, & Siegelman, 1981) .
